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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

LILLIAN JACKSON,
Plaintiff,

-vs.-

Case No~

ZINDA JACKSON, Exooutri."'{ of the

7793

Estate of JOHN JACKSON, deceased,
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE. CASE
John and Lillian Jackson were married in Moab,
Utah in the year 1896. There, were 7 children born as a
result of this union.
Prior to 1917 John Jackson became addicted to the
use of intoxicating liquors and in 1917 Lillian Jackson
filed divorce proceedings in Grand County, Utah, charging habitual drunkenness and cruelty, all as set forth in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the plaintiff's complaint. (Record, page 100 Ex. 11-12).
Mrs. Jackson employed the firm of Patterson and Constantine to conduct her divorce proceedings., and they prepared and filed a complaint for Mrs. Jackson. (Record,
p·age 12).
Up to this time they had accumulated property of
the approximate value of $50,000.00, consisting mostly of
notes, mortgages, and other securities.
At the time the suit was brought, Mrs. Jackson
had advised counsel that she and her husband had agreed
upon a prope-rty settlement. After the divorce action was
filed John and Lillian Jackson came to the office of Knox
Patterson for the purpose of dividing the property so
accumulated. John Jackson brought the securities with
him, threw them on the desk and said to Attorney ~at
terson, "Here are all of our securities, split them fiftyfifty." Patterson immediately began ·listing the property for the fifty-fifty division.
While the property settlement was being worked out,
Lillian Jackson said to John, what about the support of
the children, as you agre.ed ~ John said, I will not pay
any support money, I will divide the property equally
and you will have to support the children. A violent
argument broke out. Patterson intercede.d in behalf of
Mrs. Jackson, telling John that he could not expect his
wife to rear, and support 7 children on a 50-50 split of
the p·roperty. John became angry at Patterson, picked up
his securities and left the office. The divorce was abandoned.
John Jackson then moved his family to California.
In 1918 apparently John J·ackson wanted his wife to seSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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eure a divorce. He e1nployed counsel hilnself, had the
marriage settle1nent of 1918 prepared. This was brought
to Lillian Jackson for signature. She and the- f·amily,
including a son-in-la"~ and his "·ife, looked over the proposed property settlement and again she refused to sign
the contract and stated to John that it was the san1e as at
Moa:b, she got nothing for caring for the children. After
much argument and discussion John Jackson then agreed
that he would will to each of the children· $3,500.00 if Lillian Jackson would sign the agreement as prepared by
John Jackson and his counsel.
Upon the strength of that pro1nise and relying thereon, ~Irs. Jackson signed the agreement as prep·ared. In
good faith of John's promise to will the children $3,500.00 each, he delivered to Lillian Jackson a certificate of
the Woodmen of the World for $1,000.00, which he rep-resented was paid up, with the understanding that the
$3,500.00 which should go to each of the four girls should
have $250.00 each out of the $1,000.00 certificate, which
then stood in the name of Lillian J'ackson as beneficiary.
The certificate was so accepted by Lillian Jackson and
she received delivery thereof and has ever since had the
possession of said certificate.
At this time ~Irs. Jackson asked John to draw the
will but John told her he would not draw the will until
the divorce was secured. Then Mrs. Jackson told John
that she wanted Knox Patterson of Moab to draw the
will. It was then agreed that he would return to Moab
and after the divorce was granted and have Patterson
draw the will, bequeathing to each of the- children
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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$3,500.00, less credit of $250.00 to each of the 4 girls on
account of theW oodmen of the World certificate.
Afte·r the divorce was secured, John Jackson wrote a
letter to the W.O.W. asking for a change in the, beneficiary of the W.O.W. certificate, making affidavit to the
effect that said certificate, which has been delivered to
Lillian Jackson, had been lost. A new ce·rtificate was then
issued for $1,000.00 running to the 4 girls who should
share in the original certificate, to be deducted from their
$3,500.00 bequest. That was sometime in the early part
of 1920. What became of this certificate to the four girls
is not known so far as the Jackson family is concerned.
However, it finally got to the new wife, whom he married
immediately after the divorce.
Thereafter, on September 7,1920, John Jackson came
to Moab and to the office of Patterson and Constantine.
He there related to Patterson that he and his wife, Lillian, had agreed upon a divorce· settlement and that he
agreed with Lillian that he would return to Moab and
have Knox Patterson draw a will whe-reby he should will
to each of the children the sum of $3,500.00. He showed
to Patterson the marriage agreement and he was asked
by Patterson why there was nothing about it, the will,
in the marriage settlement. John replied that, first, he
did not want to make a will until after the divorce was
obtained, and, second, that his wife wanted Knox Patte-rson to draw the will.
John J'ackson then stated that the· will bequeathing
$3;500.00 to each of the children should be off-set as to the
4 girls, to the extent of $2 50.00, stating further that he
1
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,Y.

had delivered to Lillian Jackson a ,~r .0.
certificate for
$1,000.00 and that $250.00 should apply to the bequests
of each of the -± girls, reducing their bequests to $3,250.00.
The will was dra\vn accordingly and as to the four girls
the will reads as f oll o"~s :
To Belle Dennis $3,250.00 ''she also to receive as
beneficiary in n1y insurance policy with the W.O.W. 'to
the extent of $250.00." The san1e wa.s 'vTitten in the bequests to each of the girls.
All as sho"~ in Exhibit I, proffered in testin1ony
but rejected b~~ the court. (Record, page 100).
This will, Exhibit I, was immediately sent to Belle
Dennis, to her address in California, and their mother
was immediately advised of this fact by Belle Dennis.
Therefore, ~Irs. Jackson, knowing that the will had been
drawn was lulled into security as a result of the oral
promise by reason of the execution of the will according
to that oral promise. She never knew of the diversion
of the W.O.W. certificate until after John's death. She
never knew of the revocation of the will, Exhibit 3, by a
new will of 1946, until after John's death.
Upon the oral agreement she immediately took
charge and custody of the children, reared and educated
them to maturity.
John Jackson, as a result of speculation on his 50
percent of the property divided, ran his fortune up to
around $100,000.00. (R. p. 220).
We duly filed a claim against the Estate, a.s required
by law, and the claim was rejected, and suit was brought
thereon.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
We were required to amen<l our pleadings. when the
defendant set up the c·aiifornia Statute of Frauds. In
doing so we qualified for the plea of estop·pel.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE EXCLUDED PARTS
OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE AND SHOULD GIVE FULL
CONSIDERATION TO UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE.
(a) PLAINTIFF MAY TESTIFY IN RELATION TO
ORAL AGREEMENT.
(b) ATTORNEY MAY TESTIFY.
(c) TRIAL COURT MAY NOT REJECT UNDISPUTED
TESTIMONY.
(d) SEPARATE WRITINGS RELATING TO SAME
SUBJECT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TOGETHER.

POINT II.
THE COURT MISCONSTRUED THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS AND CONFLICT OF LAWS.

POINT III.
COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED PLAINTIFF'S
PLEA OF ESTOPPEL.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE EXCLUDED PARTS
OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE AND SHOULD GIVE FULL
CONSIDERATION TO UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE.

KNOX PATTERSON AS A WITNESS·:
Attorney at law, residing in Moab. Acquainted with
John Jackson and his wife. Did legal se.rvices for them,
from.1909 to 1925. Not on a retainer basis. Had worked
for Mrs. Lillian Jackson in 1917.'
Patterson then offered evidence showing the drawing
of the divorce complaint of 1917 and also offered testiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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I

n1ony "~i th reference to a n1arriage settlen1en t gro·wing
out of the divorce action; that the settle1nent was rejected
by Mrs. J aekson because it gave her only one-half of the
property but in1posed upon her the support of the seven
ehildren. All of this testin1ony "~a.s rejected. (R., page
181).
In a day or t"To after the divorce action "ras signed,
John Jackson and his "?ife caine to my office "·ith notes,
papers, n1ortgages, and bills, and he threw them on Iny
table and said, ''Patterson, here is all I have got, and I
want to split fifty-fifty." I took the papers and started
to separate then1, had a tablet, and "\vas classifying them
into two groups. Then ~Irs. Jackson said, "You told me.
you would take care of the children." John said : "No,
I won't take care of the children.'' Then Patterson got
into an argument 'vith him and told him he could not
expect to divide his property fifty-fifty and have the
wife take care of the children. John Jackson became
angry with him, abused him, and walked out of the office.
He heard nothing more about the divorce. Shortly after
that he (John Jackson) left and took his wife and children to California. (R., page 181).
Afterwards, in 1920 John Jackson came back to my
office and in the presence of myself and George J. Constantine stated to me he wanted to draw a will. The last
time that I had seen him, he was mad and angry with me
because he said I had sided with his wife about taking
care of the children. He said his wife had divorced him
and they made a marriage settlement and showed it to
me. I said to Jackson, "Why didn't you put this part
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
ab~ut the will in this agree·ment f' He said, "In the first

place, I wasn't going to draw any will until she got the
divorce; and, in the second place, she to~d me that she
wanted Knox Patterson to draw the will." And he came
to Utah for that purpose. In regard to t:4e marriage
settlement which he showed me, he said that she told him
that she would not sign it, and said, "No, this is just like
the Moab Settlement, and I will not sign that unless you
agree to take care of the children." And finally he told
her he would will the children $3,500.00 each if she would
sign this agreement, and he said that the $3,500.00 represented substantially what he had given his wife, so he
wanted the will drawn whereby eRch child would receive
$3,500.00. So we started to draw the will. He said, "This
isn't right. I said that I would make a will if she would
sign this agreement, but I have delivered to her a Woodmen of the World certificate for $1,000.00 that is to apply
on the $3,500.00 which I will to each of the girls." In
othe-r words, $250.00 of that ce-rtificate would be awarded
to each of the four girls, and so I drew the will accordingly. I am speaking of the will of 1920. The will shows
that each of the boys got $3,500.00 and each of the girls
got $3,250.00. (R., page 184-186).
I do not remember whether he paid me for drawing
the will. He did not pay me for the divorce because he
thought I hadn't given him a fair deal and that I had
sided with his wife.
The Court: "You we·re acting for him as his attorney~'·'

Answer: "I was acting for his wife as her attorney,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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because he told n1e that she had said that she \vanted
Knox Patterson to dra"r the "?ill." (R. p. 186).
George J. Consta.ntine and I 'vitnessed the· "?ill. He
told me to mail a copy to Belle Dennis at Orlando, Cali- .
fornia. George Constantine \vrote and signed the letter
and rnailed it to Belle Dennis. (R., page 186-187).
After this controversy arose, I asked }\ilrs. Dennis
to send me the 'vill and she did. I received the $1,000.00
W oodinen of the ,,~ orld certificate frorn ~Irs. Jackson
from California. (R., page 187).

JOE

DE~TNIS' TESTI~ION"Y:

"I reside in Fallon, Nevada. I am not an heir of
John Jackson, but a relative. I am Belle Dennis' husband.
She resides at Fallon with me.
"I have kno"~ John Jackson since 1913, when I
married Belle. I 'vas present at _Orlando, California, in
the spring of 1918 and lived in the same house with Mrs.
Jackson, when John Jackson came to the house with the
marriage settlement. ~fr. and Mrs. Jackson, myself, and
wife, and probably some of the children were present.
I heard the discussion between John and Lillian Jackson
about the marriage settlement. I did not take part in the
discussion. (R., page 191). He handed her or gave her
a marriage contract to sign and she read it over and
said she would not sign it, that it was on a fifty-fifty basis
and she would have to care for the children. They then
started to argue and the argument started when they did
settle down, he said, 'I'll tell you what I will do, I will
make a will to give each of the children $3,500.00 a piece.'
She said, 'If you will do that, I will sign it.' So, he went
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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on and said, 'I will give you that Woodn1en of theW orld,
as down payment and he handed it to her. (Referring to
the $1,000.00 Woodmen of the World certificate). As
down payment on the bargain.
''He was going to have the insurance policy made
out when she got the divorce. He got the Woodmen of
the World certificate out of his suit case."I had a further conversation with John Jackson in
1931, right here in Moab. Just he and I were present.
He told me that he had a place out here that he would
foreclose on, if Belle would take it over in place of the
$3,500.00 and we went down and looked at it, it was the
Stewart place. I think.
"I had another conversation with John Jackson in
1941. It was at the Moore place in Moab. That was in the
fall of the year. ltiy wife and I don't know, but seems
like Sinda was there too. When we went down and looked
at it John said she could have the place in the place of the
$3,500.00. He 1neant the $3,500.00 mentioned in the will."
(R., page· 191 & 195 ).
CROSS-EXAMINATION:
"My wife is the daughter of Lillian Jackson. She
is a sister of the brothers and sisters named as parties
for which this action was brought. We are here together.
I came to testify ·for her in the case. I would like. to see
her win the law suit. I would not like to see: her lose
everything." (R., page 193).
Now let us note Record, page 194, page 31 of transcript, when the above named witness, Joe Dennis, testified:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"• • • we also object on the further ground~
that it is hearsay, that this witness is an incompetent "'Fitness under the provisions of 104-49-2 Utah
Code Annotated, dated 1943, co1nmonly called the
(Dead ~Ian Statute). Also on the grounds that it
is proffered testiluony to prove an oral con tract.
"THE c·Ol1RT: 'Well, the objection that it i~
hearsay and the objection that he is incompetent
to testify, I "~in overrule. The objection that it is
proffered testilnony to prove an oral contract i:-;
sustained.' '~
The testimony given by this witness was not proffered testimony, but testimony on direct examination where
the records show he "'as fre~ to testify.
Then the witness continued to testify at length. We
are unable to say upon what theory the objection to the
testimony as proffered testimony is sustained.
It is evident throughout, as shown by the transcript
of testimony, that the Court excluded and meant to exclude any testimony in proof of an oral contract, re:gardless of performance, part performance, or estoppel.
(R., page 189, page 26 in transcript). "If you can
show me anything that will take this case orut of the Statute of Frauds, gentlemen, I would be ha-ppy to do so, but
there is no writing shown to take the case out of the
Statute of Frauds."
(R., page 190, Trans. 27). "It is evidence of an oral
contract, but understand that is just a part of it, yes, but
it isn't evidence of any writing or written agreement to.
take the case out of the. Statute of F·rauds ... The California statute says that you can't introduce oral evidence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to prove an agreement to make a will that is not in writ.
ing, the statute says that you can't do that."
(R., page 208, Trans. 43). "~ :a: "' and that it is not
admissible unde·r the Statute of Frauds pleaded by the
defendant, unless it is an attempt to show something in
writing that tends to take it out of the Statute of Frauds."
(R., page 209, Trans. 44). "THE COURT. I won't
pennit you to pro:ve that by this witness. I think she is
incomp·etent in the first place and I don't think it will take
the case out of the s.tatute of Frauds in the· second place.
MR. P ATTERS·ON: Because of an oral agreementT
THE COURT: Mr. Patterson, I don't think that it tends
to prove fraud. I don't think that what you are going to
ask her tends to pro:ve part performance. You are trying to prove by her testimony an oral contract."
The Court, having taken this position that nothing
short of a writing could prove the promise to make' a will,
it is remarkable that he ordered a pre-trial or permitted
the case to go to trial at all. It is incomprehensible~ when
we allege nothing but an oral contract in our complaint
and the part performance thereof by the delivery of the
Woodmen of the World ce·rtificate and the execution and
delivery of the. will, and the sup·port and maintenance of
all the children to maturitv.
eJ

LILLIAN JAC·Ks.ON, as a witness in her own behalf:
This witness was not permitted to testify except
in a limited sense,, to-wit:
I had a conversation with you (Knox Patterson) and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
my husband, John Jackson, in your office prior to g·oing

to California "Tith n1y husband and 7 children. One child
was married, tha.t v.ras Joe Dennis' wife. I decided to get
a divorce in California. I entered into a n1arriage settleInent there with John. John and I had some controversy
about the marriage settlen1ent. (R., page 201, T. 36).
~Ir.

Patterson then Inade the following offer of testi-

mony:
~'MR.

P 4-\.TTERS·OX: '''e offer to prove by this 'vitness, your honor, that after they had lived in California
a short .tin1e, Mr. Jackson and Mrs. Jackson decided to get
a divorce, and again the question of a property settlenlent came up, and he goes to his own lawyer and has a
property settlement prepared, which was much along the
lines as the one \vhich was prepared in ~Ioab, and he presented it to her for signature in her own home, in the
presence of Belle and Joe, and she, after reading it over,.
said, 'no I will not sign that, that is just like the Moab
Agreement and I will not sign it.' Then they fussed and
argued there for a day or two and then John finally came
to her and said, 'listen, if you will sign this, I will make
a will, willing the rest of my property to the children,
which will amount to $3'500.00 for each of the children.'
They thought that over for a while and finally agreed and
under those conditions she signed this agreement, which
is void, there n1ust be some consideration to support it."
THE COURT: Mr. Patterson I understand that she
got her share in consideration of it~
MR. PATTERSON: Certainly, they split 50-50, she
is entitled to that without taking care of any children.
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THE c·OURT: I will not let her te·stify to that because of an oral agreement. (R., page 208-209, T. 43-44).
LILLIAN JAC·KS.ON, RE-DIRECT:
Mrs. Jackson corrects herself on the date which she
received the $1,000.00 Woodmen of the World certificate
and says the certificate was delivered to her in 1918; says
she has talked to no one since her testimony of yesterday. (R., page 227).
DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY:
Counsel identifies marriage certificate· between John
Jackson deceased, and Miss Zinda Cordova, married Oct.
3, 1921. John Jackson 46, Zinda Jackson 21. Also identifies ages of 6 children of the marriage of John and Zinda.
HENRY RUGGERI AS A WITNESS:
Testifies that he has examined the authorities. of
California with reference to the Statute of F'rauds, cites
the following cases :
Hagan v. McNary, 170 Cal. 141, 144, 148
P. 937; L. R. A. 1915E, 562; Trout v. Ogilvie,
41 Cal. App. 167, 182 Pac. 333; Demattos v.
McGovern, 25 Cal. App. 2nd, 429; 77 Pac. 2nd,
522; Zaring v. Brown, 41 Cal. Ap·p. 2nd 227;
106 P-ac. 2nd, 224; S.mith v. Bliss, 44 Cal. App.
2nd 171, 112 Pac. 2nd, 30; Long v. Rumsey,
12 Cal. 334, 84 Pac. 146; Rotea v. Izuel, 14
c·al. 2nd 605, 95 Pac. 2dn 927, 164 Pac. and
914. (R. p. 220-224 & 228-230).
The Court says: "* * * excluding proof of the alleged
oral contracts to make a will I set forth the facts I could
find IF I BELIEVED ALL OF· THE EVIDENCE AND
PROFFERED EVIDENCE." (Emphasis ours).
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Then the court sets forth by alphabetical paragraphs
the 1natters he could find if he believed the testhnony.
K o"~ quoting fro1u Paragraph D of the possible findings:
•"That plaintiff and John Jackson could not
agree about a property settlernent; that shortly
thereafter plaintiff and John Jackson moved to
California and abandoned the· proce.edings in
Utah.'' (R,., page 112).
Now quoting fron1 Paragraph E of the courts possible findings :

'"That about April 22, 1918 plaintiff and John
Jackson entered into a \Vritten property agreement in the State of California, wherein and
whereby plaintiff agreed to accept property of
the approximate value of $28,689.00 and assumed
custody and support of 5 children, ages 19, 13, 10,
6 and 3, respectively, and John retained property
of the approximate value of $20,434.00 and agreed
to assume the custody and support of the child age
15." (R., page 113).
Quoting from Paragraph F :
"That plaintiff employe.d the attorney who
drafted said agreement." (R., page 113).
Quoting from Paragraph G of the court's possible
findings:
"That plaintiff and John Jackson had an
argument about this contract in the presence of
their oldest daughter, Belle and her son-in""law,
Joe Dennis, and plaintiff said that she thought
it was not fair, it was a 50-50 division and she
would have to support the children." (R., page
113).
Quoting from Paragraph H:
"That at the time of said argument, John
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Jackson handed plaintiff a Modern Woodmen of
the World Life Insurance Certificate for $1,000.00
• • * in which plaintiff was beneficiary, and told
her he would make out the policy when she got
a divorce .. " (R., page 113-114).
Quoting from Paragraph J:
''That in Dece1nber, 1919, "plaintiff" hired an
attorney and procured an interlocutory decree of
divorce from John Jackson in the State of California on the ground of drunkenness and cruelty,
'J * * and made no mention of a property settleIneut, alimony, or support money. That the judge
who signed said decree was the attorney who drew
the property agreement which was executed by
the plaintiff and John Jackson." (R., page 114).
Quoting from the court's possible findings, Paragraph K:
~'About March 13, 1920, John Jackson filed an
affidavit with the ~Iodern Woodmen of the World,
swearing that he had lost his insurance certificate, and on March 22, 1920 * * * Company issued
a new certificate for $1,000.00 with the 4 daughters of John Jackson and plaintiff a.s beneficiaries,
in the sum of $250.00." (R., page 114).
Quoting in part now from Paragraph L of the possible findings:
"That on Sept. 7, 1920 John Jackson went to
the office of Patterson and Constantine in Moab
and had the,m draft a will which he duly executed;
that said will p·rovided $3,500.00 each for 3 of the
children and $3,250.00 for each of the 4 daughters
who are beneficiaries in his insurance poJicy and
recited that they were provided for in his insurance policy to the extent of $250.00 each." (R.,
page 114).
Quoting from Paragraph N:
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"That at the time said will was made, J ol1n
Jackson told Patterson and Constantine about the
marriage settle1nent agreement and showed it to
then1. That Jackson told Patterson, 'I was not
going to dra"~ any will until she got the divorce
and she told 1ue she 'vanted Knox Patterson to
dra ,,~ the will.; That John Jackson said the $3,500.00 each represented substantially what he had
given his wife. That Jackson told PattHrson, that
he had delivered to the Plaintiff a Woodmen of
the World Certificate for $1000.00 and that it was
understood that each of the four (4) daughters
should receive $250.00 of tha.t certificate." ( R.,
page 115).
Quoting Paragraph S :
''In 1913, at ~Ioab, Utah, John Jackson offered Joe Dennis his son-in-law, to foreclose on the
Stewart property and give it to his daughtHr Belle
in place of the $3500.00. (Presumably the bequest
in the will.) (R., page 116).
Quoting Paragraph U :
"In 1941, at 1\Ioab, Utah, John Jackson told
Joe Dennis, that Belle could have· the ~foore place,
instead of the $3500.00 that was in the will." (R.,
page 116).
Quoting Paragraph W:
"That from the date of plaintiff's written contract with John Jackson on April 22, 1918, plaintiff supported the minor children of plainiff and
John Jackson, who were left in her custody until
they reached the age of majority or weTe self
supporting, and educated them and supported
herself until the, time of this action with the property she received as a result of said marriage contract and that plaintiff has exhausted the prope.rty
so received." (R. page 116).
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Quoting Paragraph X:
"That John Jackson left an estate of the value
of $97 ,931.35." (R., page 116).
Then the court in its opinion, without any evidence
thereof, says he "'.,.as obligated to speculate to some extent on the value of property distributed to each by the
contract of 1918, and draws upon his pe·rsonal knowledge
as to the value of cattle, mules, wagon, and harness in the
Spring of 1918, fixing a value of $3300.00 for 22 cattle;
$200.00 for 2 mules; $75.00 for wagon; $75.00 for double
harness ; household furniture $1000.00; Elgin automobile
$1500.00, making a total of $6150.00 and the court then
says: (R., page 116-117)
"On March 13th, 1920, John Jackson filed an
affidavit with the· ~fodern Woodmen of theWorld,
swearing that he had lost his insurance certificate
and a new certificate· was issued to him on March
22nd, 1920, with four (4) daughters as beneficiaries." (R., page 117).
Then the· Court says further:
"From the evidence introduced and from the
proffered evidence, I find as a matter of fact,
that John Jackson did not deliver the Modern
Woodmen of the World Certificate to Plaintiff
in 1918 or in 1920 and that he made no representations to the plaintiff concerning said certificate except that he told plaintiff he would have the
certificate of insurance made over to his four (4)
daughters. afte·r she procurred a divorce. I feel
that the written affidavit made to the Insurance
Company in 1920 is bette~r e·vidence· than the memory of the witnesses some thirty years later." (R.,
page 118).
* * •
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''That if any such oral agreetnent \Vas made.
it is invalid under the Statute of Frauds of the
State of California. That defendant is not estopped to set up the Statute of F'ra.uds of the State
of California." (R., page 118).
HThat plaintiff is a proper party plaintiff in
this action. I conclude that plaintiff's action
should be dismissed a.t plain tiff's costs." -( R. page
119.
It "ill be observed in the caption of the ~{emorandum opinion that the court refuses to believe plaintiff's evidence in the case.
Then in concluding the Memorandum Decision the
court gives us the final knock-out blo\v in which he says :
"I find fron1 all the evidence in the case which
I consider admissible and competent that John
Jackson did not n1ake an oral agreement to make
a will as pleaded by the plaintiff or otherwise or
at all." (R., page 118).
This decision no doubt was intended to be decisive
of the entire case, as the· general rule is that this character of case the superior court follows the findings of
the trial court. However, we recall proudly that superior
courts have uniformly held that a trial court cannot arbitrarily and capriciously utterly refuse to consider undisputed testimony in the case. This part of the court's
decision is unwarranted, unfair, and unjust. This question is treated hereinafter.
The court talks disparagingly of the· memory of the
plaintiff's witnesses, yet it does not hesitate to draw
upon its own memory and go back 33 years to state the
value of cattle, mules, wagons, harness, and an automo~
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bile, when the·re was no evidence with reference to these
iten1s and n1ost surely the court had no knowledge of the
kind of cattle or mules, and the wear and tear of the
machinery. Just why the court saw fit to comment on
these items we are unable to say, as all of the testimony
shows a desire and intent to split the property on a 50-50
basis, and, furthermore, the items which the court named
were supposed to be included in the farm property for
which Mrs. Jackson was charged $14,000.00.
The court finds that in 1918 cattle we·re worth $150.00 a head, perhaps there are members of the court who
can recall that we were in a financial slump and that
shortly there~after banks were failing everywhere, especially those carrying cattle· paper.
If our memory serves us, the Honorable Judge, 33
years ago, was somewhat of a boy.
The court further says :
"I find one serious inconsistency with the
testimony offe·red by the plaintiff, in that she
testified 'three times' that she received the life insurance certificate in 1920." ( R., page 117).
Now let us turn to the transcript and see what hap-

pened. We insist that plaintiff did her very best to tie
the delivery of the Woodmen of the World certificate to
the promise to make a will :
"Q. Have you had possession of this certificate·'
A. Ever since he: promised-"

The obvious answer would have been, ever since he
promised to make the will. But objections and the court
ruling prevented the old lady from giving the correct
date. Again:
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"Q. Can you fix the time by another event?
A. 1920, I am sure that I received it when I had
that-"
Obviously she was going to ans"rer when I had that
agreement with John, but again she was frustrated by
court and counsel.
Then again:
"Q. Do you kno'v when you got possession of that
certificate~

A. I got possession-"
* * *
'~The Court: I won't permit her to testify
to any event if she can fix the tin1e to an exact
date." (R., page 211-212').
The reading of the transcript clearly shows that she
would have fixed the receipt of the W.O.W. certificate
at the time the oral agree-ment to make the will was had.
It is evident that she was unable to fix the exact date
except by the course of events at the time, and it was
erroneous for the court to refuse to permit her to connect
the date with these events. (R., page 211).
I believe the record shows Mothe·r Jackson to be 76
years of age.
The court, in his memorandum opinion, says that he
prefers to belie-ve the letter that John J acoibson. wrote
to the Woodmen of the World where it is said he had lost
the certificate than the evidence in behalf of the plaintiff.
We insist that the affidavit of loss of certificate is self
serving not germane to the- issue, but it is evidence that
John Jackson did not dare to call upon his wife for the
Woodmen of the World certificate because he told her
it was a paid up certificate-. It, of course, she was not
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capable of analyzing. Then, again in this connection, keep
i,n rnind that when the certificate was changed and issued
to the four girls as beneficiaries, neither Mrs. Jackson
nor any of the: girls e~er knew of· such change until after
John Jackson's death. So if he had promised to issue a
new ce·rtificate with the girls as beneficiaries, they never
received it and never knew anything about it. His call
upon Lillian Jackson for surrender of the W oodrnen
of the~ World certificate would have tipped her off immediately that something was wrong and would lead to
Inquiry.
Jackson's affidavit with reference to the loss of the
Woodmen of the World certificate was a deception which
the court, in its prejudice against the plaintiff's testimony
could not appreciate.
PLAINTIFF MAY TESTIFY IN RELATION TO
ORAL AGREEMENT.
(a)

We say yes, for the reason that the~ plaintiff, Lillian
Jackson, is suing in a representative capacity and she is
made a trustee of an expressed trust by our statute. Utah
Code 1943, Section 104-49-2.
It is evident she has no direct p·ecuniary interest in
this proceeding. She sacrificed the W.O.W. certificate
of which she was the beneficiary; the: will of 1920 gave
her nothing. She sacrificed everything for herself to the
end that her children should finally reap the benefit of
any estate which might accrue to John Jackson by reason
of the fact that he took the money from the children,
approximately $24,500.00, to speculate on during his lifetime and built his estate up to app·roximately $100,000.00.
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Section 104-3-1, U.C.A. 1943, provides every action
must be prosecuted in the nrune of the real party in inte.rest, except that an executor, administrator, or trustee
of an expressed trust may sue without joining the party
in interest.
..._\ person "itl1 'vhom or in whose nan1e a contract
is made for the benefit of another is a trustee of an
expressed trust within the meaning of this section.
Section 104-49-2 disqualifies a party to any civil
action and all persons directly interested in the event
thereof.
The term "party" as above defined has been the subject of a great confusion with the court, including o~r
own courts.
58 A. J., Sec. 282 defines the meaning of "party'~
as foilows:
. "A statute disqualifying a "party" from testifying as to transactions with a deceased person
does not apply to one who is not a party o:r interested therein but is a mere witness.. According to
some authorities, although on its face the statute ·
disqualifies every person who is made a party to
the record, its application is limited to those persons who are properly joined as parties, and further to those of the prop~r pa,.rties to the record
who are parties to the issue.. "
Thus it appears that the term "party" is generally
meant to include only those who are directly interested
in the result of the suit.
Sec. 284, q uorting :
"Nominal Parties.-Although some statutes
have been construed to include nominal parties
as embraced within the me·aning of 'parties' disqualified as witnesses in an action against a perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sonal representative of a decedent or the guardian
of an incompetent, according to the construction
generally placed upon these statutes, the 'party'
'opposite party,' etc~, who is silenced, is the real
party in interest, and not a mere nominal party
who is not interested in the result of tke suit. A
nominal party has been held competent to testify
as to the execution of a lost deed by a decedent."
(Italics ours.)
· · Exsted v. Exsted, 117 A.L.R. 605 (Minn.):
"The difficult question, and one of first impression before this court, is w}J.ether an administrator is a party within the meaning of the statute. Since it operates to exclude otherwise competent evidence, the statute should be strictly, although fairly, construed. Sievers v. Sievers, 189
Minn. 576, 250 N.W. 574. On its face the statute
disqualifies every person who is made a party to
the record. The application of this language has
been limited to those persons who ar:e properly
joined as parties. (Towle v. Sherer, 70 Minn. 312,
73 N.W. 180), and further limited to those of
the proper parties to the record who are parties
to the issue.
"An executor or administrator, while a necessary party to the record, is not a party to the issue. In Bryant v. Livermore, 20 Minn. 313, Gil.
271, opinion per Berry, Jr., the appellant challenged the right of Mr. Chief Justice Ripley to
sit in the cause because of his relationship to the
guardian ad litem and general guardian of the
minor defendants under a statute disqualifying
a judge of a court of record from hearing a case
when he was a relative of a party to the action.
The court resolved the question against the ap-
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pellant upon the ground that a guardian ad liten1
is not a pa.rty, but is a representative· in the nature
of an attorney appointed by the court of the~ real
party in interest and by ",.hon1 an infant is required to appear in an action. He is not a party
in interest merely because he is answerable to the
infant "'"hon1 he represents for his negligent conduct of the suit or because in some rare circumstances he might be chargeable with costs."
Thus it will be seen fro1n the reasoning of this case,
'vhich follo"~s many Inore, that where a disqualified party
resigns the disqualification is removed, but this 1\Iinnesota case and the authorities cited thereunder hold in fact
that where a no1ninal party is suiting it would be a
futile thing for a nominal party rightfully suing to be
compelled to resign in order to obviate the alleged disqualification. The law does not require a futile thing;
in fact many of the authorities hold that a person is not
required to resign as a party simply to qualify the testimony.

It is obviou.s here that Lillian Jackson' is suing as
.the representative of her children and our statute makes
her a tru-stee of an expressed trust.
The case of Begovich v. Begovich, 60 A.L.R. Page
1046, (Wyo.) goes to the right of Mrs. Lillian Jackson
to testify.
This Wyoming case holds that a guardian ad litem
is not a "party" to an action within the rule excluding
testimony as against a person since deceased, but merely
a representative of the court.
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In re Van Alstine's Estate, 26 U. 193, 72 Pac. 242.
One of the parties was Dora S. Van Alstine, guardian
ad litem, her testimony as a party defendant was questioned under the statute relating to "parties." To quote:

"* * * By the express terms of said subdivision, the disqualification of persons as witnesses
on the ground of interest is limited to such as have
a direct interest in the event of the "civil action,
suit, or proceeding." Unless, therefore, Mrs. Van
Alstine has such an interest, she was not disqualified as a witness. To be directly interested is the
same thing as having a direct interest. A direct
interest is the opposite of an indirect interest,
and excludes the idea of contingency. A direct
interest is defined in Winfield's Words and
Phrases, p. 195, as follows : 'A direct interest is
one which is certain and not contingent or doubtful.' In Black's Law Dictionary it is defined as
follows : 'A direct interest, such as would render
the interested party incompetent to testify in regard to the matter, is an inte·rest which is certain
and not contingent or doubtful.' At common law
a contingent liability for costs dependent upon the
results of the suit disqualified a witness, but, by
the express tern1s of the subdivision referred to,
the common-law rule has been changed, and the
disqualification restricted to a direct interest in
the event of the suit or proceeding. The remote,
doubtful, and contingent liability of Mrs. Van
Alstine for costs is not a direct interest, and therefore the court did not e·rr in overruling the objection of the proponent."
It is obvious that Mrs. Van Alstine was a rep·resentative of other defendants as guardian ad litem. We can
make no distinction between representative of the court
testifying and Lillian Jackson in this case, she is a trustee
1
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of an expressed trust under the statute and having no
interest is fully eompetent to testify.
Ho"~ard

(lTtah) 180 Pac. 429. l\Iark
Howard, a defendant, "~as held to be qualified to testify
because of the fact that he had no interest, a merely
nominal defendant.
Re Grieve v.

In addition to the authorities cited, we have the
Utah case of ~filler Y. Livingstone, 31 U. 415, 88 Pac.
358, and Stats v. Stats, 63 U. 470, 226 Pac. 677, to the
effect that where the controversy is between heirs of the
decedent as to the division of the property of the estate,
all parties to the action, and other in teres ted parties,
may testify.
In the case of Doty v. Doty, 2 L.R.A. (NS) 713, it
quotes extensively from Kentucky case which analyzes
the principles of law involved. We again call the court's
attention to the fact that at the time these proceedings
first arose there "~ere six minors, ranging in age fron1 2
to 17 years.

The court says in the Doty case, where they attempted to disqualify the guardian:
" 'If she were to resign as guardian on learning that her testimony "ras necessary to, protect
his interest, and another were appointed in her ·
stead, she could, after she was removed, and when
another had been substituted in her place as
guardian, testify for the infant in the action. * * *
The action of the county court in appointing a
guardian for him, or the failure of the guardian
to preserve his interests by resigning, should not
be allowed to destroy the infant's rights * * * If
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the mouth of the infant's 1nost important witness
can be closed by that person's being appointed
his guardian, then the rights of infants may be
often sacrificed by the statute that was designed
for their protection."
The guardian in the Doty case occupies exactly the
same position as Lillian Jackson in the instant case, pursuant to agreement between the mother and father of the
Jackson children.
(b)

ATTORNEY MAY TESTIFY.

The defendant has questioned the right of attorney
who drew the will for John Jackson to testify in relation
to the drawing of the will made an exhibit to plaintiff's
complaint.
It will be observed that counsel for the defendant
made no objections to the testimony of the attorney who
drew the will of 1920 on the ground of professional ethics,
but only upon the ground that the communication between
the attorney and John Jackson was p-rivileged and barred under our statute. This question has been decisively ·
answered by our own supreme court in re Young's Estate,
94 Pac. 732, 33 Utah 382, which speaks as follows:
"Prof. Wigmore, in his work on Evidence·,
· Vol. 4, No. 2314 in concluding a discussion of the
question of privilege, as ap·plicable to an attorney and client in cases of will contests, states the
rule as follows: 'But for wills a special consideration comes into play. Here it can hardly be doubted that the execution and especially the ·contents
are impliedly desired by the client to be. kept secret
during his lifetime, and are accordingly a part of
his confidential communications. It must be assumed that during that period the attorney ought
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not to be called upon to disclose even the fact of a
will's execution, n1uch less its tenor. But, on the
other hand, this confidence is intended to be te.rnporary only. That there rnay be such a qualification to the privilege is plain. That it appropriately explains the client's relation with an attorney
drafting a will seems aln1ost equally clear. It follows, therefore, that after the testator's death the
attorney is at liberty to disclose all that affects the
exec?.t.tion and tenor of the U'ill. The only question
could be as to cornmunications tending to show the
invalidity of the "\\ill, i. e., fron1 "\Yhich a circumstantial inference could be dra·wn that the testator
was insane or 'vas undulv
. influenced. It mav be
conceded that the testator would not wish the attorney to assist in any 'vay to overthrow the
will.' " (Italics ours.)
~

:1=

*

*

"As to the tenor and execution of the will .
it seems hardly open to dispute that they are the
very facts which the testator expected and intended to be disclosed after his death; and, with this
general intention covering the whole transaction,
it is impossible to select a circumstance here._ or
there (such as the absence of one witness in another room) and argue that the testator would
have wanted it kept secret if he had knorwn that
it would tend to defeat his intended _act. The confidence is not apportionable by a reference to what
the testator might have intended had he known
or reflected on certain facts which now bear
against the will."
:f::
* *
"In the following cases the doctrine of privilege between an attorney and client is discussed,
and it is held that communications or statements
made by the deceased to the attorney preparing
the will with respect to the subject-matter the~reof
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and what the attorney heard or saw with respect
hereto do not fall within the privilege." (Citing
many authorities).
Then again in the case of Anderson v. Thomas, 159
P. 2d 142, Utah, 1945, this case cites the opinion in
Young's Estate with ap·proval and then says:
''That case involved a wills contest and we
held that the privilege did not apply. The reasons
for the holding are discussed at length and we believe the opinion to be sound. But it does not appear that even in a will contest case the attorney
can testify regarding distinct professional transactions totally unrelated to the pre.paration. of the
w.
ill "
58 A. J ., Sec. 505, Page 283, lays down the rule as
follows:
"It may be laid down as general rule that
in the absence of anything in the statute governing
the privilege, making it apply to testamentary
matters, communications by a client to the attorney who drafted his will, in. respect to that document, and transactions occurring between them
leading up to its execution, are not, after the
client's death, within the protection of the· rule as
to privileged communications, in a suit between
the testator's devisees and heirs at law, or other
parties who claim under him. A reason for this
exception is that it cannot be said to be for the
interest of a testator, in a controversy be:twe.en
parties all of whom claim under him, to have those
declaratioos and transactions excluded which are
necessary to the proper fulfillment of his will."
(Italics ours.)
Re W-ebb v. Webb (Utah), 1949, 209 P. 2d 201:
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"(6) As to appellant'~ contentions that the
conversations bet\\Teen attorney and decedent weTe
inadmissible because they were .confidential colnmunieations bet,veen an attorney and client and
would haYe been inad1nissible against the interests
of the client and were therefore inadmissible
against the interests of his legal representatives~
it need only be pointed out that even if there
'vere an attorney and client relationship existing
between attorney and the decedent, which the
attorny denies, claiming only an agency relationship, nevertheless, the conversation vrould have
been adn1issible under one of the exceptions to
that rule since both appellant and respondent
were elain1ing under the client and the intention
of the decedent "Tas ilnportant in determining
what their rights 'vere. See Jones on Evidence
2nd Ed., Sec. 2164 'vherein it is stated'* * * Thus
where, after the death of the client, litigation
arises bet,Yeen the parties all of whom claim
under the client and the question to be deteTmined is not the existence of a right of action
against the estate, but the intention of the decedent as to the creation of various rights which
remain ambiguous, the attorney may testify * * :K'.
Thus an attorney has been permitted to testify
in an inquiry to ascertain, as between devisees
under the clients will and a grantee claiming
under a deed from the client n1ade after the 'vill.'
"From what we have· said it follows that the
court did not err in admitting in· evidence the
conversations obj·ected to a.nd that there was
therefore sufficient evidence to sustain its findings."
Carey et u..r. v. Owell et al. (Washington 1949), 20-i
P.2d193:
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"Attorney, who had drawn will and contract
for deceased wherein she agreed to bequeath
pr,operty to her daughter if daughter would look
after her was not barred under dead man's statute from testifying because of his interest in
suit for sp·ecific performance of the contract by
daughter, where prior to commencement of suit,
he had not contracted with daughter as to what
his fe·e would be, he had no agreement for contingent fee, and it was understood that a charge
would be made for his services at conclusion of
the case."
POINT I.
TRIAL COURT MAY NOT REJECT UNDISPUTED
EVIDENCE.
(c)

Authorities are legion that trial courts cannot repudiate clear, concise, and undisputed testimony.
20 Am. Jur.1030, S.ection 1180:
"Generally, testimony given by a disinterested
witness, who is in no way discredited by other
evidence, to a fact within his orwn knowledge,
which is not in itself improbable or in conflict
with other evidence, is to be. believed; and in
many cases it is said that the facts so given are
to be taken as legally established. It is often
said that uncontradicted evidence must be taken
as true • • •."
Hynes v. White (Calif.), 190 P. 838:
"The only evidence bearing on the intention
of Hay to make the first gift was that of Mrs.
White (the beneficiary of the gift). A court may
not arbitrarily disregard the unimpeached ei\Tidence of a single witness. If her statement was
true, all the elements of a gift inter vivos were
present, and if the gift was made, even though
the donor was immediately given absolute posSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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session of the property, it did not 1uilitate against
the gift."
Parker v. Weber County Irrigation District, 68
lTtah 472, 251.

Pac..ll (1926), page 13:

~'The

witnesses were not impeached nor their
testimony in any particular discredited or contradicted or impaired. The court thus was not
at liberty to disregard it and make a finding contrary thereto, which in effect was done by finding
that there 'vas no such agreement or unde-rstanding as testified to by the witnesses. In other
,,·ords, the district by undisp·uted evidence proved.
What this court on the first appeal said was a
complete defense to plaintiff's cause, but the court
by its finding disregarded such evidence and
found contrary thereto; and hence it follows that
the finding n1ust be set aside and the judgment
based upon it vacated."

Harness et al. v. Indu-strial Commi.ssion of Utah,
115 l;. ______ , 17 Pac. 2d 277: (1949)
"In the absence of some reasonable basis
for disbelieving the uncontradicted evidence
offered in support of an application for compensation, the commission may not disregard such e·vidence. The evidence may, as a matter of law,
require an affirmative as well as a negative finding." (Page 279).
The testimony of Joe Dennis is undisputed and
without taint that the W.O.W. certificate was delivered
by John Jackson to Lillian Jackson, and that he then
and there agreed to make a will, willing to each of his
children $3,500.00, taking credit for the $1,000.00 W.O.W.
certificate, to be deducted from the bequests to the four
girls.
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Lillian Jackson's testin1ony is undisputed that John
Jackson delivered to her the W.O.W. certificate under
circumstances related by Joe Dennis.
The proffered testhnony of the attorney who drew
the will, which should have been admitted, is undisputed,
and this will shoi\\rs the deductions provided for in the
oral agreement, at the time Lillian Jackson signed the
marriage settle1nent of 1918. Take the will of 1920 and
account for those deductions in the bequests to the four
girls, except as explained by Joe Dennis.
The attorney could not get this information and
1neet these requirements :in any haphazard way, it could
only come to the attorney, 'vho drew the will, from ~John
Jackson himself.
The will is evidence of the oral agreement. The oral
agreement, in turn, explains the provisions of the will.
See authorities cited above.

POINT I.
(d) SEPARATE WRITINGS RELATING TO SAME
SUBJECT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TOGETHER.

Searles v. Gon.zales, 216 Pa.c. 1003 (Cal.) :

"There may be instances in which it would be
a violation of reason and common sense to ignore
a reference which derives its significance from
parol proof. On the other extremes are cases
'vhich hold that parol evidence is admissible to
show that separate writings pertain to the same
transaction, for the purpo.se of establishing the
connection by subject matter requisite to incorporate the separate writings under the the.ory of
implied reference hereinbefore stated."
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A.yoob v . . J.yoob, 168 Pac.. 2d 462:
"'Failure of writing to make express reference to precedent oral a.green1ent is immaterial.
It is sufficient if they both together establish an
agreement."
57 An1. Jur., page 165, Sec.187:
•'Proof of a contract to devise property in
consideration of services rendered may be found
in a "ill executed by the pron1isor and containing a bequest in favor of the person who has
rendered services for the testator. In fact, it is
said that under such circumstances the, instrument
is strong corroborative proof of the contract."
Citirtg Heatt v. Williams, 72 Mo. 217, 37 Am. Rep.
438.
57 . .-\m. Jur., page 171, Sec. 193:
"The exercise of equity jurisdiction in the
enforcement of a contract to make a will in consideration of services does not proceed upon any
distinction between real and p,ersonal prope.rty,
the distinction is in the character of the services."

Tigglebeck v. Russel, 213 Pac. 2d 156 (Ore.):

"* • * The general rule is that, if the,re is
evidence tending to show the existence of a contract, proof of the execution of a will containing
a devise or bequest in favor of one who performed
services for the testator is corroborative proof
of the contract." (Citing cases).
POINT II.
THE COURT MISCONSTRUED THE
FRAUDS AND CONFLICT OF LAWS.

STATUTE OF

Following the points relied upon, and also following the memorandum decision of the court, we discuss
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the question as to whether the Statute of Frauds of the
State of California is applicable here~n.
The court applied the Statute of Frauds of the State
of California in resolving the contract of 1918 entered
in the State of California. The court wholly reje.cts the
pleadings and position of the plaintiff that said contract
of 1918 was subject to an oral agreement, made at the
time the contract of 1918 was ente·red into.
We reject the Judge's reasoning on this point,
will hereinafter appear.

a~

First let us conunent upon the situation: It is true ·
the plaintiff, Mrs. Jackson, had moved to California and
it may be said she established a residence there. The
contract of 1918 was entered into in the State of California, but supplen1enting the contract of 1918 was an
oral agreement which required the conclusion of thi:-:
contract in the State of Utah. It will be borne in mind
that Mrs. Jackson, the plaintiff, requests that John
Jackson return to Utah and- have Attorney Patterson
draw the will which he promised to execute and it will
be observed that John Jackson did return to 1\Ioab, Utah
and executed the will pursuant to his oral agreement;
that JoJm Jackson remained in Utah the rest of his life
and pyran1ideq his assets of $24,500.00 to something in
excess of $97,000.00. So it n1ust be observed that Mrs.
Jackson had a distinct idea as to where the concluding
· part of the agreement 'vould be consummated; she may
have had particular trust in the Attorney she chose to
draw the will; she may have chosen the laws of Utah to
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interpret and enforce that will; and she must have known
that the bequests of the will would be paid in the State
of lTtah.
One of the controlling rules in determining the lex
loci or the lex fori turns upon the question of whether
the statute of Frauds is substantive or p~rocedural.
Another test rests with the intention of the parties .
...\nother relates to the question of whether the contract is against public policy.
Another relates to the citus of the last act to be perfonned under the contract.
While we intend to follow the citations of the court
in determining the lex loci and lex fori and cite general
authorities thereon, let us make this comment on general
questions of law which affect the general jurisdiction on
general questions of all states and all jurisdictions. Let
us lay down the rule that in our opinion where any state
has definitely settled such general questions it is no
longer an issue so far as the text writers and annotators
are concerned. So we definitely contend that both California and Utah have decided one question in this respect: That both the laws of California and Utah, so far
as the statute of frauds is concerned, are procedural
and remedial and not substantive and hence controlled
by the lex fori. To state further, all questions arising
in the instant case must be determined by the laws of
Utah because California has definitely determined that
their Statute of Frauds is procedural. That is to say,
that if California and Utah have determined the quesSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion at issue, as to lex fori and lex loci, then we are not
concerned with general rules laid down by text writers
and annotators.
Another familiar rule in determining the state where
a contract is entered into is:
"Where the last act is done which is neces~
sary to give the contract validity, is the place of
execution of the contract." Page on Contracts,
Vol. 6, page 6180.
Then further:
"Re1nedies are fixed by the laws of the forurn,
and parties cannot, by the contract, compel the
court to give remedies other than those which are
afforded by the system of jurisprudence which
the court adminis~ters." Page on Contracts, ol.
6, page 3617.

'T

So we conclude on this point that the blind adherence of the court below to the "substantive" view wa~
error and, consequently the Utah Statute is controlling
and the California Statute of Frauds has nothing to do
with this controversy.
The court cites Crofoot v. Thatcher et al., 19 Utah
212, 57 Pa~. 171. In reading· this case the first thing we
find is this :
"Under the issue raised in this case, it i~
necessary to determine whether the laws of Utah
or the laws of N ebra.ska govern and control in
this case. It is conceded that the statute of liinitations falls within the remedy, and the law of
Utah controls in so far as the remedy is concerned
as applied to a.n existing a.nd enforceable ca,use
of action.." (Italics ours).
The above case 'vas dealing with substantive law
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39

of the State of Nebraska.
The court also quoted l.J!l ercantile Contpany v. Fra;nk
(Calif.), 56 A.L.R. 696, which holds that a chattel mortgage valid in California is valid everywhe·re. This is
substantive law again. A man cannot lose his lien to
property just because the property is transferred to
another state. It would be the same if the chattel property 'vere stolen and taken into another state .
. .;\.gain
.
the court quotes McMan.u..s v. Fulton (~fon
tana), G7 A.L.R. 690. ·Here again it is substantive law,
interpreting the Blue Sky Law 'vhich declares certain
contracts void.
So it must be observed that whether the forum law
controls, turns upon the point as to whether the· foreign
law is substantive or remedial.
The following California cases hold the Statute of
Frauds of California is remedial:

In re Balfou.r and Garrette, 111 Pac. 615. Held:
~'Since the Statute of Frauds p·res.cribe merely
a rule of evidence going to the enforceaqility of
the contract, a subsequent memorandum could
validate the transaction even if it were oral."

Warden et al. v. Hutchinson, 231 Pac. 563. Held:
"The court construing C.C. 1624, subdivision
7, said contracts were not void and the action
would lie."
0'Brien v. 0' Brien, 241 Pac. 860. Held:
"Contracts falling within the· op·eration of the
Statute of Frauds, but made in contravention
thereof, are not invalid in the sense that they are
void, but are merely voidable."
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0/frntan v. Robertson, 251 Pac. 830. Held:
"Contracts within and in contravention of
the Statute of Frauds are voidable, not void.
The remedy and not the validity of the. contract
being affected."

Durbin et al. v. Hillman, 195 Pac. 274. Held:
"Contract was. not void but merely unenforceable. We are not called upon to attempt to define
the very difficult word "invalid" as used in Section
1624 of the Civil Code, but it is sufficient for our
purpose to say that it describes a condition that
falls short of being void."
More recent cases, as shown by citators:
Leoni v. Delaney (Calif., 1948), 88 Pac. 2d
765; Ayoob v. Ayoob ( c·alif., 1946), 168 Pac. 2d
462-466; Brown v. Superior Court, 212 Pac. 2d
878-81 (Calif.); Coleman v. Satterfield, (Calif.,
1950), 223 Pac. 2d 61-63; Monorco v. Le Grecco~
211 Pac. 2d 363 (Calif.).
Let it also be understood that the subject of public
policy is a criterion for determination of the lex fori
as against the lex loci :
It is our contention, as we allege, that the alleged
written rna.rria.ge settlement between plaintiff and John
Jackson, standing alone, is wholly against the public
policy of both th~ states of California and Utah.
Here we have a contract which admittedly purports
to divide equally the community property acquired by
the plaintiff and her husband during marriage. Then
we have a husband shunting his wife and seven children
from their horne in Utah to California, where a marriage
settlen1ent is executed, which, construed alone, gives the
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wife only one-half the property, to \vhich she is entitled

if there 'vere no children, and then imposing upon her
the obligation to support and educate the children until
they reach their majority 'vithout support mone:y or other
consideration. We say: That such a contract is against
public policy; that without the oral agreement, pleaded
by the plaintiff, it cannot be given validity. It requires
the oral agreement to make the settlement fair, just and
equitable, and "Te believe it to be the policy of the court
to adopt a course which will give legality to such contracts.
The case of Palmer v. Palmer, 26 U. 31, 75 Pac. 3,
is a case cited by the court, the first syllabus of which
reads:
HThe principle of comity cannot be invoked
to require one state to enforce a contract entered
into in another state, where the contract is in
contravention of the publiC- policy of the state
in which enforcement is sought."
A reading of the case will verify the syllabus.
In the case of Mertz v. Mertz, 108 A.L.R. 1120, the
courts of New York refused to enforce a contract entered
into in Connecticut between husband and wife because
it was in contravention of public policy of New York.
Let us invoke another general rule. That where a
husband and wife are dealing with each other in family
matters, the husband is bound to the utmost go<>d faith.
In this case the wife was not represented by counsel.
She had no advice in the marriage settlement, .and the
attorney who drew the marriage· settlement, later became
the judge in the divorce action was granted
the judge in the divorce action who granted the decree.
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No mention of the marriage settlement in the decree of
divorce. N e·ver confirrned by any court.
Quoting from 26 Am. Jur., 876:
"The relationship of husbarid wife is generally regarded as a confidential nature. In :many
jurisdictions, particularly the cornmunity property jurisdictions, statutes expressly provide that
transactions between them shall be subject to the
general law governing transactions between persons in a confidential relationship * * * the doctrine that fraud may be predicated on unfulfilled
promises made with an intention of nonperformance has been applied to promises of one spouse
inducing a conveyance to hin1 or her fro1n the
other spouse * * *. It is recognized that the n1ost
dominant influence of all relations is that of husband over wife, and transactions between them,
to be valid,; particularly as to her, must be fair
and reasonable and voluntarily and understandingly made. Such transactions are jealously scrutinized to prevent the wife from being overreached
or defrauded by the undue influence or improper
con/duct of the husband; and when they are
brought about by anythrng runounting to constructive fraud on his p·art they are voidable by
the wife and are. not enforceable against her, at
least in equity. At least such. transactions are
voidable against all p·ersons other than bona fide
purchasers. Whenever independent counsel would
be of real assistance to the, wife in deciding whether to enter into a transaction with her husband,
it is his duty to advise her to seek such counsel;

Jorgenson et al. v. Pardee (C'alifornia, 19,50), 224
Pac. 2d 835:
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••• • • Confidential relations are presumed
to exist between husband and wife, and in his
dealings with his wife the husband, if he obtains
an advantage over her, 1nust show that he has
not abused the eonfidence presumably reposed in
him by her and resulting from the marital relationship. If the husband fails to bear the. burden
of showing that the transaetion with his wife was
fair and just and fully understood by her, the presumption arises that the transaction was entered
into by the wife under the undue inuflence of her
husband and was fraudulent."

Fernandez v. Aburrea, 183 Pac. 366, holds that a
father has a continuing duty to support his children.
State v. Supreme Court, 74 Pac. 2d 888 (Washington), Syllabus:
•'Father was under a common law obigation
to support his child during its minority and such
obligation continued without regard to divorce
decree, since parties could not, by divorce decree,
stipulate away right of child to support by father."
Tremayne v. Tremayne, 115 Utah ______, 211 Pac. 2d
452: (1949)
Then further:
Anthony v. Anthony, 211 Pac. 2d 331 (Calif.) :
"Property settlement contracts are binding
only when approved by the court."
Danz v. Danz, 216 Pac. 2d 162 (Calif.) :
"The duty to provide for children is a matter
of public policy."

POINT III.
COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED PLAINTIFF'S
PLEA OF ESTOPPEL.
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So we will now discuss the question of estoppel
under general law and under California law.
Of course, if the court should agree with us that
the California law is remedial and not substantive, this
argument is surplusage because we would be under Utah
law solely.
As heretofore stated, we clearly recognize the principle in this class of case that we must present clear and
concise evidence, taking into account every circumstance
relating to the transaction, and that we must show a
change of position with reference to those claiming under
the oral contract and an enrichment to those who "\vould
re~pudiate the oral contract. We, therefore, start with
the position of the parties, reiterating:
That by reason of the oral agreement pleaded, the
position of the 'vife was changed in this : She assumed
an obligation which "\Vas to run for approximately twenty
years, an obligation which her husband was compelled
as a matter of law to assume, or, at least, a substantial
portion of it. She sacrificed her right as beneficiary
under W.O.W. insurance, she was tied up for the next
twenty years to warrant the care, control, and education
of said children; she sacrificed the right to present this
question_ squarely before the court in obtaining fair
and just support money against he~r husband, a present~
existing obligation resting upon him. That he was permitted to take the childrens' share of the property, speculate with it at will 'vhile she was exhausting her resources to carry the burden, which he was duty bound
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to share; that all of this 'vas suffered "~hiJe relying upon
his promise to "ill to the children $3,500.00, 'vhich he
did, but after she ha.d fully perforn1ed on her side, he
attempted to revoke the contract will, thus defeating
his oral pron1ise, upon " . hich she relied. That he fully
complied in 1naking the contract " . ill, of 'vhich she was
fully advised and thus lead to believe that John was acting in good faith.
There were no laches on her part. She did not know
the contract will was ever revoked, and she did not know
a new will was made until his death. She thus had no
opportunity of protecting herself until these acts of
repudiation had become manifest.
That he "~as extremely anxious for her to obtain the
divorce must be evidenced from the fact that within
less than one year after her decree became final, he
came back to :Moab, and married another wife·, Zinda
Cordova, of the age of twenty-one years, and had six
children as a result of that marriage.
That the deceased was greatly enriched by the use
of the $24,500.00, the use of which was reserved to him
during his lifetime, thus relieving him of the burden of
providing for his minor children. He increased the sum
from $24,500.00 to approximately $100,000.00.
That the enforcement of this oral contract would
not be onerous to the second wife or her children since
they would have left to them around $75,000.00. F'urthermore, Zinda Jackson is not an innocent p·arty. She
kne:w that John Jackson was the father of these seven
children and that he· had a legal duty to support them.
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49 A.J ., Sec. 306, page 617 :

"* * *

and in son1e cases which have considered the fact that the oral agree1nent has been
acted upon the rule has nevertheless be.en applied.
Other cases, however, and this seems to be the
majority rule, liinit the doctrine to executory
Inodifications. Accordingly, in many cases where
the agreement as modified has been acted upon,
the rights of the parties have been held to be
determined by the n1odified agreement. This is
especially true if there has been what amounts
to a part performance, or if both parties have
governed themselves by the modified agreement.
These courts, while recognizmg the. general principle that an agreement required by the statute
of frauds to be in writing may not be substantially
altered by an oral agreement, take the position
that parties may not accept the· benefits from
such alteration and then claim that the transaction is void."

49 A.J., Sec. 550, page 853:

"* * * The courts have repeatedly reiterat.ed
that the statute of frauds only applies to executory, as distinguished from executed, contracts;
if a;n oral contract, otherwise within the stat1.1rte,
·is completely executed or performed it is taken
out of the operation of the statute. This is upon
the basis of the often-repeated theory that the
statute of frauds was intend.ed to p·reve.n,t fraud
and not to be a cloak for fraud or a mearns of
perpetrating fraud, under this rule of completed
performOJnce, suit may be brought upon the contract in a court of law over the objection that the
contract was 1.vithin the statute of fra.u.ds." (Italics
ours).
49 A.J ., Sec. 582, page 889 :
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"RELATION BETWEEN DOCTRINE OF
ESTOPPEL AND P~ART PERFORMANCE.The doctrine that part performance will take· an
oral contract out of the statute of frauds rests
in its essence upon the ground of estoppel, and
it has been said that 1nany of the objections to
the doctrine of part performance fall away when
it is viewed as an application of principles of
estoppel. The doctrine of part performance op·erates on the theory of estoppel, particul~arly estoppel by conduct, to a certain extent, and not upon
any notion that the court has power to dispense
with the statute, or that it is not as obligatory in
equity as at lau,_ However, this doctrine had its
origin prior to and independently of the modern
doctrine of estoppel by conduct, and its op·e.ration is more extensive than that of the ordinary
forms of estoppel; under the doctrine o[ part performance, a person may not only be· precluded
from asserting his title or interest in property,
but he may even be compelled to make good or to
specifically perform his representations. On the
other hand, although the acts of one of the parties
to an oral contract may be insufficient to amount
to part performance, the other party to the contract may be estopped by his conduct to assert
the statute of frauds against the contract." (Italics
ours).

19 A.J ., Sec. 52, page 656 :
Then we find the modification, which in effect holds
that the former doctrine is lacking in consideration, Sec.
53, to quote :
"The broad rule stated in the preceding section to the effect that a promise to do or not to
do something in the future does not work an estop~..
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pel must be qualified, since there are numerous
cases in which an estoppel has been predicated on
promises or assurances as to future conil;uct. The
doctrine of "promissory estoppel" is by no means
new, although the name has been adopted only in
comparatively recent years. According to that
doctrine, an estoppel may arise from the making
of a promise, even though without consideration,
if it was intended that the promise should be
relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and a
refusal to enforce it would result in othe;r injustice. Promissory estoppel is sometimes spoken of
as a species of consideration or as. a substitute
for, or the equivalent of, consideration, but the
basis of the doctrine is not so much one of contract with a substitute for consideration, as an
application of the general principle of estoppel,
since the estoppel may arise although the change
of position of the. promisee was not in any way an
inducement to the promise and was not regarded
by the parties as any consideration therefor."
(Italics ours).
49 A.J ., Sec. 556, page 862 :
"Under the rule stated, where. one of the
parties to an unenforceable oral .contract has
rendered services thereunder for the other, made
improvements on the land of such other party,
paid out money to such other party, or has parted
with and turned over to the other party pToperty
real or personal as the consideration for a promise
which the latter refuses to perform, asserting the
protection of the statute of frauds, the law will
raise an implied promise on the part of the latter
to p·ay for what bas been done in the way of performance, holding him liable for the value of the
benefits which he has re-ceived. A party who has
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repudiated his verbal contract cannot invoke the
statute of frauds to enable hhn to retain 'v hat he
has received of the other party under it in part
perfor1nance thereof.~There is no attack upon our pleading, no de1nnrrer,
no motion "~as filed in the cause and we distinctly raise
the issue of estoppel, as """ell as fraud.
In the case of ]If onsen et al. v. Monsen, 162 Pac. 90
(Calif.), ,,~e find the following:
''A man may n1~ke a valid contract, binding
himself to dispose of his property in a particular
way by will, and a court of equity will enforce
such agreement specifically by treating the heirs
as trustees and compelling them to convey the
property. (Cases cited).
''The requirement of Civ. Code, Sec. 3390,
that to be specifically enforced the terms of an
agreement must be sufficiently ~ertain to make
the precise act which is to be done clearly ascertainable, applied to contracts to dispose of pro~
perty by will." (Cases cited).

Notten et al. v. Mensing et al. (C;alif.), 45 Pac. 2d

198:
"Estop·pel-it is not necessary to existence
of an equitable estoppel that there should exist a
design to deceive or defraud, but it is sufficient if
person against whom estop·pel is asserted by his
silence or his rep-resentation has asserted a belief
of existence of a state of facts which it 'vould be
unconscionable to deny.
"Frauds, statute of-Complaint alleging o~ral
agreement of husband and wife to leave property
to their respective collateral kindred, making of
reciprocal wills pursuant to agreement, husband's
death before either will was revoked, 'vife's
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acceptance of benefits under husband's will, wife's
revocation of old will and execution of new one
in violation of oral agreement, held sufficient to
raise estoppel to plead statute of frauds. ( Civ.
Code, Sec. 1624, subd. 6; Code Civ. Proc. Sec.
1973, subd. 6)."
This case involves construction of n1utual wills.
In the instant case we have the pro1nise to make a
will on the one side, the consideration of which is the
services of the wife on the other side in rearing, supporting, and educating the children of husband and wife.
It cannot be denied that the plaintiff has fully performed; it cannot be denied that the deceased, John
Jackson, performed to the extent of making a will, pursuant to the mutual understanding between the two.
N o"r what difference can there be in principle in
the issues involved in the case at bar and the n1aking
of 1nutual wills described in the case of N ott en v. Mensing
et al.? Likewise, is there any distinction in the principle
involved in the case at bar and Monsen v. Monsen, above
quoted 1
In re Alexander v. Lewis (Wash.), 175 Pac. 577.,

we quote this case because of the simplicity in which
contracts relating to testamentary disposition of property are treated. Here we say there is no mystery involved
in the case at bar, the only question is, can we prove it
or have 've proved~
"There is nothing mysterious or mystifying
abou,t contracts to devise by will. They are valid
and will be enforced as other contracts and

'
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'vhere the promisor has repudiated his c.ontract,
and, although such a c.ontract is not broken until
death so as to support a cause of action, one court
at least has gone so far as to hold that a. bill quia
tin1et is available to fix the legal status of property 'vhere the pronrisor has repudiated his contract during his lifetin1e and has atte1npted to
make other disposition of his property.* • :it:
·"\Vhile the testator 1nay destroy the will or exeeute another revoking it, the contract itself cannot be rescinded, and "'ill be enforced by the court
in favor of the person who has acted upon it.'
Underhill on the La'v of "\Vilis, Sec. 289." (Italics
ours).
In 106 A.L.R., page 758
this subject, as follows :

"~e

find the rule stated, upon

'"As pointed out in earlier annotations, it
seems that in order that part performance may
· operate to take a contract of the kind under consideration herein out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds, the services must be exceptional
and extraordinary in character, or it must appear
that the promisee's whole course of life would
change by performance of the contract."
Likewise ·73 A.L.R., page 1392 again announces the
rule:

"*

* The undertaking of each to perform
was a sufficient consideration for the promise of
the other. That it was oral does not affect its
enforcement. Bird v. Pope, 73 Mich. 483, 490, 41
N.W. 514. The breach of it by the one cannot
but operate as a fraud upon the other. The husband continued to rely upon the contract, and at
his death all of his property passes to his wife
under his will. While by mutual consent the con*
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tract might have. been abrogated during the lifetime of the husband, at his death it became an
irrevocable oibliga tion on the. part of the wife.''
In Goodin v. Castlemen (N.D.), 200 N.W. 95, we find
this language :
"Where a will is made pursuant to a contract
for support, in which the party to furnish the
support is 111ade the beneficiary, and where such
party had entered upon the performance in the
1nanner contemplated, and has not repudiated
or broken his obligation, the will may not be
revoked so as to deprive him of his contract
rights."
Under the instant case we have a contract and full
perforn1ance throughout lifetime, and likewise. full performance by the promisor in that he made the will pursuant to contract, and we insist that any atten1pt to
revocate that will, as to the contractual features, i~
against all law, equity and justice.
Let us also call the court's attention to the fact that
counsel has failed to quote the California statute which
gives us relief under the same Statute of Frauds.
Civil Code (Calif.), 1931:
''1623-Contract not in writing, through
fraud, may be enforced against fraudulent party.
When a contract, which is required by law to be
in writing, is prevented from being put into writing by the fraud of a party thereto, any other
party who is by such fraud led to believe that
it is in writing, and acts upon belief to his prejudice, 1nay enforce it against the fraudulent
party."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

53
''1972-Last section not to extend to certain
cases. The preceding section must not be construed to affect the power of a testator in the
disposition of his real property by a last will and
testament, nor to prevent any trust from arising
or being extinguished by implication or operation
of law, nor to abridge the powers of any court
to compel specific performance of an agreement,
in case of part performa.nce thereof". (Italics
ours).
On the question of fraud, let us say in passing,
there is no direct evidence of fraud in the oral p-romise
to make the will, but having made the will he revokes
it, which gives vitality to the theory that the entire oral
promise was intended to deceive Lillian Jackson and
defraud the beneficiaries of the will.
Likewise the delivery of the W.O.W. certificate, while
it may have been delivered in good faith and upon the
representation that it was a paid up certificate, may not
have been, at the time, intended as a fraud, but the later
diversion of said certificate to his later wife would relate
back to the initial transaction, clearly showing a fraud
and a deception practiced upon his first wife.
Let us call the court's attention to the fact that
immediately after entering into the marriage settlement
and the delivery of the W.O.W. certificate to Lillian
Jackson, he wrote the W.O.W. that he had lost the certificate and had another one issued to the four girls.
This may have been entirely genuine and done pursuant
to the oral agreement, but later, after he married Miss
Cordova, this certificate was cancelled and a new one
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issued to the new wife. This of itself constitutes a fraud
which likewise relates back to .the oral agree.ment.
Fuller v. Nelle et al., 55 Pac. 2d 1248 (Calif.). This
case is decidedly involved orver a probate court jurisdiction. However, it is sta.ted:

"Testatrix who orally agreed with husband
not to revoke a n1utual will and who, upon the
husband's death, received and accepted the husband's estate, could not transfer as'sets of the two
spouses in violation of the terms of agreement
(oral) with her husband." (Italics ours).
Also at Page 1250 it is said:
"In view of what has been said above we think
it is clear that it becomes whoJly immaterial that
the probate court found that the purported written revocation was valid, th~ purported holographic will was valid, and that the defendant
Mrs. Nelle was not guilty of duress, fraud, menace, or undue influence. No one of those facts
eliminates, or tends to eliminate, the contention
that, after Mrs. Fuller had received and accepted
the estate .of her deceased husband, she. was in no
position to then transfer the assets of the two
spouses in violation of the terms of her agreement
'vith her husband."
Also observe the discussion of the case of Aho v.

K usnert, 87 P. 2d 358 (Cal.) To quote:
"The second count alleged that plaintiffs'
stepfather induced their mother to purchase property with her separate funds in reliance on his
representation and promise that plaintiffs should
have the property when the mother and 'ste'Pfather
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ried after the dea.th of the plaintiffs' n1other. Despite the fact that the agreement was oral, the
c.ourt held that the defendant received the property in trust for the plaintiffs. As stated in the
opinion: 'By reason of his pron1ise and understanding " ..ith plaintiffs' mother Kusne·rt (the
father), upon her death, rec.eived title to real property paid for in part by her se·parate funds and in
part by eomn1unity funds. He broke his promise
to her " ..hen he devised said property to his second
wife. In such circmnsta.nces equity, through fastening a trust upon the property, will secure to
plaintiffs the benefits of said promise although
orally made." 12 Cal. 2nd at Page 690.
Ryan v. Welte (Cal) 198 P. 2d 3'57. This case upholds and enforces an oral agreement to make a will and
stresses the point that the Statute of Frauds cannot be
imposed to defeat an oral agreen1ent to make a will in his
behalf.

It is also an interesting case upon n1any of the fundamentals of cases of this type. To quote:
'~ (4-6)
Citing the facts in the cases of Brazil
v. Silva, supra; and Fuller v. Nelle, 12 Cal. App.
2d 576, 55 P. 2d 1248, defendants contend that
there are no similar allegations of actual fraud
in the complaint here·. While the word 'fraud' is
not used and while the facts here are different
than those shown in the cited cases, the complaint
does allege the fact that Daniel in complete disregard of his agreement conveyed and devised the
property to others than those entitled to it under
the agreement. This, as will be pointed out later,
constituted constructive fraud. As said in N otten
v. ~fen sing, 3 Cal. 2d 469, 45 P. 2d 198, 202 : 'In
order to raise the estoppel, fraud in some form
is essential, but it is not required that an actual
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intent to defraud or mislead exist; all that is required is that there exist "a fraud inhering in the
consequence of thus setting up the statute.' * * *
Although in the present case fraud is not. alleged
as a conclusion, the facts from which that conclusion nece'ssarily follows are alleged."
In the case of Freenten et al v. River Fa.rms Company (Cal.) 1936, 44 Pac. 2d 199, the plaintiff here sued
on an oral protnise that the president of the defendant
company promised to take up bonds of the corporation
and cash them and pay for repair \Vork on its ditches.
The defendant pleaded the Statute of Frauds (Civil
Code, Sec. 1624, subdivision 4). The court held, however,
that the 'vork was fully perforn1ed and that it was necessary work for the corporation and held that the Statute
of F'rauds had no application.
In the case of Grant v. Long et al (Cal.), 92 P. 2d
940. Quoting froin the sylabus 'vhich is strictly followed
by the opinion of the court.
"Frauds, Statute of-The fundamental rule,
that as the statute of frauds is designed to prevent faud it cannot be invoked to: perpetrate a
fraud, is based on the doctrine of estoppel and is
applied in cases in which one party in reliance
on a pa.rol contract that should ·have been reduced
to writing has changed his position or parted with
value so that it would be an injustice to permit
the other party to plead the statute of frauds."
The court said the contract had been fully performed
for many years and the defendant was estopped to set
up the Statute of Frauds.
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Mayborne -v. Citize-ns' Trust & Sa.l:ings Ba.n.k, (Cal.)
1920, 188 Pac.. 1034. While this case deals with quantum
meruit it has some interesting features of the ease at
bar.

Quoting from sylabus :
'~'vork

and Labor - That Payment Would
be Equitable Considered in Determining Intent to
Pay. In an action against the estate of a decease.d
person to obtain value of service~s rendered, it
was proper for the trial court, in determination
of intention of parties, to weigh the circumstance
that it would be just and equitable for plaintiff to
be rewarded for her services.
~•Limitation

of Actions-Statute does not Run
Against . .-\ction
.
for Services Under Contract for
Indefinite Time. Where a contract to pay for services, express or implied, is for an indefinite time,
and no time for payment is specified, the statute
of limitations does not begin to run until the services end."

Burrows v. Burrows et

ttx,

(Cal.), 22 Pac. 2d 1072,

1934. This is another case in point but emphasizes one
particular feature of our case and that is in dealing with
family relations the master mind of the family cannot
hold benefits conferred by others in such relationship
unless such others had independent advice.
This case likewise was take·n out of the Statute
of Frauds by reason of oral promises.
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Jones v. Clark, (Cal.) 119 P. 2d 731, 1941. This case
was mentioned by court or counsel in the oral argument
but refers specifically to specific performance which was
disallowed by the court.
It lays down the doctrine that mutuality of remedy
applies only to executory contracts and not executed
contracts, as in the case at bar.

In re Brown v. Superior Court, (Cal.), 212 P. 2d 881,
1949. This case is not only in point gene-rally but goes
specifically to the point of right of party to revoke a will:
"It is argued by respondent that petitioner
has not shown an actual or potential cause of action because he has not alleged that the contract
between George and Abigail contained an express
agreen1ent not to revoke the mutual wills. It is not
necessary, however, that there be an express
agree1nent to this effect in order to enforce a contractual obligation to leave property to designated
persons at death. In every contract there is an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
that neither party 'vill do anything which injures
the right of the other to receive the benefits of the
agreernen t. (Citing 128 P. 2d 665 (Cal.), 177 P. 2d
931 (Cal.) "\Vhere the parties contract to· make a
particular. disposition of property by will, the
agreement necessarily includes a promise not to
breach the contract by revoking the will and failing to dispose of the property as agreed. The
rights of the parties depend upon the contract,
and the revocation of the will or other bre,ach of
the contract does not prevent the intended devises or legatee fron1 enforcing the contractual
obligations." (Citing many authorities).
In re Sargavak's Estate, 216 P. 2d 850. (Apr. 1950):
"Declarations made by a testator at, before
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or after execution of an instrun1ent are admissible,
if offered for the purpose of ascertaining the intent with which instrument was executed and not
for purpose of proving the meaning testator attributed to specific provisions of an admitted will."

Monarco v. Lo Greco, 220 P. 2d 737, (Cal.), 1950.
This case assembles and correlates nearly every case
that has come before the Courts of California. This. action was for services rendered and held to be of peculiar
and unusual character.
1

After oral agreement that he would be given onehalf interest in the Estate property, we find that one
Christie, on promise of the inheritance, worked diligently
in the family venture. He gave up any opportunity for
further education or any chance of accumulating property of his own. He received only his room and board and
spending money. When he was married and suggested
the possibility of other emploryment to support his wife,
he was told to move into the family, that he, Christie,
need not worry for he would receive the property when
Natale and Carmela died. The p·rop·erty increased in
value to $100,000.
The court held that the oral p·romise to make a will
was good and that he was entitled to the prop·erty. The
opinion holds:
"The controlling question is whether plaintiff
is estopped from relying upon the statute: of
frauds (Civil Code No. 1624; Code Civ. Proc. No.
1973) to defeat the enforcement of the oral cootract. The doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute of frauds has been consistently applied by the
courts of this state to prevent fraud that would
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result fron1 refusal to enforce oral contracts in
certain circumstances. Such fra.ud may inhere in
the unconscionable injury that would result from
denying enforcement of the contract after one
party has been induced by the other seriously to
change his position in reliance on the contract,
* * *'' (Quoting many cases.) (Underscoring
ours).
The above case is worthy of serious consideration,
it goes into the questions of fraud, specific performance,
quantum merruit, and oral contracts and clearly shows
the change and progress in theory in the recent c·aiifornia cases and the earlier ones on these questions.

Walker v. Calloway, 222 P. 2d 455, (Cal.) 1950. This
case closely follows Monarco v. Lo Grece. It is an action
for . specific performance of an oral agreen1ent to will
decedent's entire estate to the plaintiff in consideration
for services rendered decedent. After making the promis to will, the property was willed to another. The plaintiff was formerly the wife of decedent and they lived
separate and apart. She was induced to return from
Michigan to California to nurse and care for the deceased
by reas<~ln of the oral promise to will his property to her.
In its opinion the court says :
"Where a contract is within the statute of
frauds, as it is here, Civ. Code, sec. 1624 ( 6) ; Code
Civ. Proc. sec. 1973 ( 6), the mere rendition of
services is not usually such a part performance of
a verbal agreement as will relieve the contract
from the operation of the statute, but 'if the se-rv-
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ices are of such a peculiar e.haract.er that it is impossible to estimate their value by any pecuniary
standard, and it is evident that the parties did not
intend to measure them by any such standard,
cases the reason for the interposition of equity
is quite obvious. Plaintiff has rendere.d service
of extraordinary and exceptional character-such
service as, in contemplation of the parties, was not
to be compensated for in money, and, as in contemplation of law, cannot be compensated for in
money. Therefore by no action at law could a
plaintiff be restored to his original position. It
would be in the nature of a fraud upon him to deny
him any relief, and, the law failing by reason of
its universality, equity, to promote justice, makes
good its imperfections. W at. Sp·ec. Perf. Cont
sec. 41; Porn. Spec. Perf. sec. 114. Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 450, 45 P. 710, 712, 33 L.R. A.
369; McCabe v. Healy, 138 Cal. 81, 70 P. 1008;
Anno. 69 A.L.R. 14, 120, et seq; 106 A.L.R. 742,
756, et. seq.".
Likewise this case lays down all the necessary requirements for proof in such action and thoroughly analyzes dozens of c·alifornia cases on the subject, finally
holding that the plaintiff is entitled to a new trial under
the peculiar circumstances of the case.
It will be observed, also, that the services of the
plaintiff were of short duration, from May 1947 to January 6, 1948.

Berkey v. Hahn, 224 P. 2d 885. (Dec. 1950). At page

889:
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"Where a party to an oral contract has been
induced by the other party seriously to ·change
his position in reliance upon, or in performance of
the contract, and would suffer an unconscionable
injury if it were not enforced, or if unjust enrichment would result * * * the doctrine of estoppel
will be invoked and the statute of frauds will not
be available to perpetuate the fraud. * * *"
This case refers to Monarco v. Lo-Greco as the latest
expression of the Supreme Court on the subject.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts and authorities we
most earnestly contend that:
1-The Trial Court should have admitted the testimony of the Plaintiff in relation to the oral agreement
with the deceased, John Jackson, respecting the willing
of parts of his estate to the children of both plaintiff and
John Jackson.
2-The Trial Court should have received all the
testimony of attorney, Knox Patterson.
3-The Trial Court should not have rejected the undisputed testimony of the witness Joe Dennis and other
undisputed testimony.
4-The Trial Co!lrt should have considered separate writings which related to each other and bore out
the oral testimony offered in the case.
5-The Court Inisconstrued the Statute of Frauds
and Conflict of laws in relation to the case at bar.
6-The Trial Court should have considered plaintiff's plea of Estoppel to defendant's plea of the Statute
of Frauds.
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Finally we contend that judgtnent should be ordered
by this court as prayed for in plaintiff's complaint, upon
the facts and the law of the case, or at the very minimum,
that the case be remanded for a new trial with instructions to admit all the above mentioned testimony offered
by the plaintiffs and to enter judgment accordingly.
Respectfully submitted,

KNOX PATTERSON,
0. A. TANGREN,

Attorneys for Plaintiff
Address : 205 Boston Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah
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